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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Act) of 20021 was the U.S. Congress's hasty
response to the wave of corporate scandals that had begun to devastate U.S.
investor confidence during the previous year. Its sixty-six pages contain a
wide range of measures designed to enhance the quality and independence
of corporate audits and disclosure under the U.S. securities-regulation
regime. The Act applies to public corporations-corporations that are
required to file regular financial reports under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in drafting rules to
enforce the Act, interpreted it to apply to foreign private issuers (FPIs)
registered with the SEC.2 This surprised many observers because of the
* J.D candidate, 2005, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18 U.S.C.).
2 A foreign private issuer [hereinafter FPI], defined in SEC Rule 3b-4, is a corporation
organized outside the United States, with fewer than 50% of its voting shares owned by U.S.
citizens and a majority of non-U.S. executive officers, assets and business. Sabyasachi
Ghoshray, Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed Corporations: Conflicts in
Comparative Corporate Laws and Possible Remedies, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 447,
448-49 (1964). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to, and this article discusses, only those
FPIs that become subject to the Exchange Act and SEC regulation by selling their securities
on U.S. exchanges or having a minimum number of U.S. shareholders.
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SEC's general tendency to exempt foreign corporations from many of its
rules.3
President George W. Bush signed the Act into law on July 30, 2002.
In the ensuing weeks, none of the Act's provisions were more controversial
than Sections 3024 and 906,5 which require corporate CEOs and CFOs to
certify the accuracy of various financial statements filed under the
Exchange Act.6  By providing such certification, the officers become
personally liable for inaccuracies. For FPIs, the certifications apply to
financial reports to the first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2005. 7
Some FPIs see the certification requirements as an insuperable burden and
an outrageous incursion into their home countries' regulatory regimes.
Objections from German corporations and observers were particularly
vigorous.8 At least one German FPI registered with the SEC has since
deregistered and left the U.S. regulatory regime. 9 The implications and
effects of the Act's certification requirements for German FPIs are in
controversy.
Part II of this article tells the official story of the Act's certification
requirements: their initial conceptualization by the SEC, their inclusion in
the Act, and their enforcement in SEC rulemaking. Part III introduces the
SEC's landmark decision to apply the certification requirements, along with
other of the Act's provisions, to FPIs. The German reaction is discussed in
Part IV. For German FPIs, the tangible costs of compliance with the
certification requirements are considerable. Part V explains the real reason
for the strenuous German objections to the certification requirements: the
requirements are a shock to a corporate system very different from the
flexible, profit-focused U.S. model. This comment concludes, in Part VI,
that although the certification requirements may scare some German issuers
3 See infra Part Il1.
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2002).
5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
6 See Stephan Hutter, Mark Devlin & Johannes Burkard, US and German Corporate
Governance: Principles: A Comparison, CORP. FN. MAG., Corporate Governance Guide,
Sept. 2002, at 13, 16-17, available at http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/ 12232l.pdf
(last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
7 See Press Release, SEC, Extension of Compliance Dates Regarding Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting Requirements (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-2 1.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (extending deadline
for non-accelerated filers for compliance with rules promulgated under § 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Those rules, discussed infra, clarify the procedures for filing
certifications under § 302 and § 906.) [hereinafter Extension Press Release].
8 See Daniel Bogler, Germany's Balance Sheet Police, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 8 2002, at 13
(noting that "German companies with US listings have complained more loudly than anyone
else about the consequences of America's Sarbanes-Oxley Act.").
9 See infra Part IV.
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away from U.S. capital markets, the benefits, both for investors and for
those issuers who choose to remain, outweigh the costs. Complying with
the certification requirements is 'shock therapy,' to be sure, but cheaper
capital, higher efficiency, and global competitiveness will be the results.
II. THE SARBANES-OXLEY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND
THEIR APPLICATION BY THE SEC
Corporations making false or misleading statements in reports filed
with the SEC have been subject to liability under Section 10(b)(5) of the
Exchange Act for decades.'0 Beginning in 1980, the SEC required U.S.
corporations' principal executive and financial officers to sign a Form 10-
K, used for U.S. corporations' annual reports." In its ambitious "Aircraft
Carrier" proposals, the SEC first raised the possibility of requiring U.S.
officers to certify as well as sign.12 Had the proposals been enacted, top
management would have been required to certify for each financial report
that they had read the report and that it did not contain any false or
misleading facts or omissions. 13
A. The June Proposal
After their company's 2001 collapse, Enron executives testifying in
congressional hearings tried to avoid responsibility for the misdeeds that
had resulted in massive profit overestimations in the company's financial
reports.' 4  In March 2002, President George W. Bush outlined a new
corporate-responsibility plan, including a requirement that "the CEO's
signature [on financial statements] should also be his personal certification,
vouching for the veracity and fairness of the financial disclosures.' '  On
10 Exchange Act § 10(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2000).
11 See Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and
Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
17114, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 2, 1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R).
12 See The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7506A, 63
Fed. Reg. 67,174 (proposed Nov. 13, 1998) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17
C.F.R.) [hereinafter Aircraft Carrier Release]. The Aircraft Carrier Release proposed a
sweeping overhaul of the securities-regulation system; they were never carried out.
13 See id. at 67, 244-345.
14 See The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 2; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 91-




&QueryZip=skilling&, (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
15 See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality
Award Ceremony (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
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June 17, 2002, the SEC revived its push for certification requirements in
proposed new rules under the Exchange Act of 1934 (June Proposal).16 The
new rules
require[d] a [reporting] company's principal chief executive officer and
principal financial officer to certify that, to their knowledge, the
information in the company's quarterly and annual reports is true in all
important respects and that the reports contain all information about the
company of which they are aware that they believe is important to a
reasonable investor. 
17
The SEC justified adding certification on top of the existing signature
requirements by stressing corporate officers' responsibilities to personally
ensure high-quality disclosure: "[A]ny senior corporate official who
considers his or her personal involvement in determining the disclosure to
be presented in quarterly or annual reports to be an 'administrative burden,'
rather than an important and paramount duty, seriously misapprehends his
or her responsibility to security holders."'
8
The June Proposal also included rules requiring every reporting
company to maintain internal procedures designed to ensure that "the
company is able to collect, process and disclose... the information,
including non-financial information, required to be disclosed in its...
reports. '" 9 The Proposal's rules also required executives to certify that they
had reviewed the results of evaluations of the internal procedures.At
Importantly, the June Proposal stipulated that the new rules would not
apply to FPIs for three reasons. First, Form 20-F, used for FPIs' annual
Exchange Act financial reports, did not have the management signature
requirement of Form 10-K.1  Second, FPIs were not required to file
quarterly reports, as domestic issuers were.22  Finally, "mandatory
requirements regarding internal procedures raise several issues, since those
requirements may be inconsistent with the laws or practices of the foreign
private issuers' home jurisdiction and stock exchange requirements.
Since reporting requirements for FPIs involved fewer signature
2002/03/20020307-3.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
16 Proposed Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877 (June 17, 2002) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240 & 249) [hereinafter June Proposal].
17 Id. at 41,877.
18 Id. at 41,878.
19 Id. at 41,881.
20 Id. at 41,878 passim.
21 Id. at 41,882.
22 June Proposal, supra note 16, at 41,882.
23 ld.
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requirements, no quarterly reporting, and allowances for home-jurisdiction
regulatory regimes, the SEC apparently felt that it would be inappropriate to
impose the same certification requirements on FPIs and domestic issuers.
Eight days later, on June 25, 2002, the second-biggest corporate
scandal of the period erupted when WorldCom, Inc. admitted misstatements
in financial reports amounting to nearly $4 billion.24 The SEC reacted to
this devastating news on June 27 by requiring the CEOs and CFOs of 947
domestic issuers with annual revenues of over $1.2 billion to provide June
Proposal-style certifications by August 15.25 U.S. corporations had their
first executive-certification experience.
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Congress, at this time, was in the midst of drafting its response to the
corporate scandals-the legislation that became the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Section 302, a provision quite comparable to the June Proposal, was drafted
and added to Subchapter III of the Act.26 Meanwhile, the Sarbanes-Oxley
bill, on its way to becoming law, "subsume[d] similar legislation,"
including the White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act (WCCPEA).27
One of the provisions of the WCCPEA also concerned executive
certification; it became Section 906 of the Act.28
Thus, when President Bush signed the Act into law on July 30, 2002,
two separate certification sections came into effect. Section 302 requires
each reporting company's principal executive and financial officers to
certify "in each annual or quarterly report" that "based on the officer's
knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact [and that] the financial statements...
fairly present ... the financial condition ... of the issuer., 29 Like the June
Proposal, Section 302 mandates a set of undefined internal procedures
designed to ensure accurate financial disclosure.30 Section 302 further
instructed the SEC to promulgate rules implementing it by August 30,
24 BRUCE C. BENNETT & GRAHAM ROBINSON, ExECUTivE CERTIFICATIONS 11 (Covington
& Burling) (2002) at http://www.cov.com/publications/download/oid6024/311 .pdf (last
visited Nov. 18, 2004).
25 Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/4-460.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
26 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, supra note 4.
27 Christopher Wyant, Executive Certification Requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002: A Case for Criminalizing Executive Recklessness, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 561, 569
(2003).
28 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, supra note 5.
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, supra note 4. For the text of Section 302, see infra
Appendix I.
30 Id. § 302(a).
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2002.31
Subsection (b) of Section 302 provides that corporations cannot escape
Section 302's requirements by reincorporating outside of the United
States.32 Some commentators have suggested this means Congress did not
intend for Section 302 to apply to FPIs.33 If FPIs filing financial reports
were subject to Section 302, any U.S. corporation that moved its offices and
became an FPI would still be subject to Section 302. Without some
possibility that U.S. corporations might escape the certification
requirements by becoming FPIs, there would be no need for subsection (b).
Even so, nothing in Section 302 denied that its provisions would be applied
transnationally.
Section 906 of the Act is deceptively similar to Section 302.34 It, too,
requires chief executive and financial officers to certify the veracity of
financial statements. But its requirement is different:
Each periodic report containing financial statements filed by an issuer
with the [SEC] ... shall be accompanied by a written statement by the
[officers, certifying that the report] complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act pf [sic] 1934...
and that information contained... fairly presents ... the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer.
35
Section 906 does not include Section 302's protective clause "based on the
officer's knowledge."
36
While Section 302 contemplates enforcement by the SEC through that
agency's regular rulemaking, Section 906 contemplates criminal
enforcement. Section 906 includes specific criminal penalties for
enforcement: a maximum fine of $1,000,000 and ten-year jail term for
certifying a faulty financial report, and a maximum fine of $5,000,000 and
twenty-year jail term for willfully doing SO.
37
Section 404 of the Act is also important to any discussion of executive
certification. 38  It requires management to produce an "internal control
report" as part of each annual Exchange Act report.39 The report must
31 Id. § 302(c).
32 Id. § 302(b).
33 See Comments of Linklaters on S7-21-02, Aug. 19, 2002, at A.3, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/linklaters1.htm.
34 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, supra note 5. For the text of Section 906, see infra
Appendix II.
31 ld. § 906(a)-(b).
36 id.
31 Id. § 906(c).
38 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002).
31 Id. § 404(a).
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affirm management's responsibility for the establishment and maintenance
of an "internal control structure" and assess the effectiveness of that
structure.4 0 Like with Section 302, the SEC is directed to promulgate rules
implementing Section 404, but the section did not impose a deadline.4'
C. The Amending Release
In order to carry out Section 302's directive to promulgate certification
rules by August 30, 2002, the SEC issued another release (Amending
Release). It modified the rules suggested by the June Proposal to be
consistent with Section 302.42 The release contained a statement that
became one of the SEC's most controversial decisions of the year: that
Section 302's certification requirements would apply to FPIs.43 By
reversing the June Proposal's statement that FPIs would be protected from
the certification requirements, the SEC set off a firestorm of controversy
among FPIs and foreign commentators."
D. The Adopting Release
After receiving comments from the legal community, corporations,
and the public, the SEC issued a release (Adopting Release) adopting final
rules implementing Section 302 on August 29, 2002.45 Despite the ongoing
international controversy over the application of the certification
requirements to FPIs, the release reiterated that FPIs would be subject to the
rules. It reasoned that "Section 302 of the Act makes no distinction
between domestic and foreign issuers. ' ' 6
The language of the final rules was very close to that of Section 302.
However, the final rules eliminated the foreign-reincorporation language of
Section 302 and added a provision that CEOs and CFOs would not be
allowed to delegate the responsibility of making the required certification to
40 Id. § 404(a)(1)-(2).
41 Id. § 404(a).
42 Proposed Rules: Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46300, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,508 (Aug. 8, 2002) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, & 249) [hereinafter Amending Release].
43 Id. at 51,509.
4See infra Part IV.
45 Final Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports,
Securities Act and Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722, 67 Fed. Reg.
57,276 (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R) (adopting new
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14, requiring principal executive and principal financial
officers to certify all reports filed on Form 10-Q, Form 10-QSB, Form 10-K, Form 10-KSB,
Form 20-F, and Form 40-F under Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act) [hereinafter
the Adopting Release].
46 Id. at 57,278.
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any of their subordinates.47 The Adopting Release also modified each of
the forms that would now require certification-including Form 20-F-to
include specific language mirroring Section 302.48
E. The Section 404 Release
On June 5, 2003, the SEC issued a release adopting new rules that
implemented Section 404 (Section 404 Release). 49 This release and its new
rules attempted to resolve a variety of conflicts and ambiguities surrounding
Sections 302, 906, and 404. It clarified that certifications pursuant to
Sections 302 and 906 are to be provided separately as exhibits to the reports
to which they relate. ° However, the two certification requirements are
significantly different because Section 302 requires its certification to be
"in" the financial report, while Section 906 requires its certification merely
to "accompany" the report.5' That is, Section 302 certifications are
potentially subject to greater liability.52 The release set forth detailed
standards for the Section 404 "internal control report," which took shape in
a highly complex, detailed document.53 Moreover, it consolidated all of the
various rules' internal controls designed to ensure accurate financial
reporting under one definition: "internal control over financial reporting."
54
Recognizing that "foreign private issuers may have greater difficulty in
preparing the management report on internal control over financial
reporting," the SEC allowed FPIs extra time to comply with the new
Section 404 rules.55 FPIs were instructed that compliance would be
required "in annual reports for [the] first fiscal year on or after April 15,
2005. '56 In February, 2004 the SEC extended this deadline to July 15,
2005. 57 By that date, FPIs had already been subject to the basic certification
requirements for a year. However, the addition of an internal control report,
even with a significant adjustment period, added a substantial new task for
management.
41 Id. at 57,288-90.
48 Id. at 57,923-94.
49 Final Rule: Management's Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities and Exchange Acts
Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Section
404 Release].
'0 Id. at 36,652-53
51 Id.
52 See id.
13 Id. at 36,642-43.
14 Id. at 36,640-41.
55 Section 404 Release, supra note 49, at 36, 65 1.
56 id.
57 Extension Press Release, supra note 7.
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To summarize, the current certification and disclosure requirements
imposed upon FPIs by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC rulemaking are as
follows:
The Section 302 certification requires that an FPI's principal executive
officer and principal financial officer must each certify: (1) that the officer
has read the report; (2) that, based on the officer's knowledge, the report
does not contain any false or misleading fact or omission; (3) that, based on
the officer's knowledge, the report fairly presents the FPI's financial,
operational and cash-floor situation; and (4) that the officer has ordained
both disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over financial
reporting, evaluated the effectiveness of the controls, disclosed such
effectiveness and any material changes in the controls in the report, and
made certain disclosures to the FPI's auditors.58 False certifications under
Section 302 "are subject to SEC enforcement action for violating the
Exchange Act and also possibly to both SEC and private litigation alleging
violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act." 5
The Section 906 certification requires that an FPI's CEO and CFO
must each certify (1) that the report fully complies with the appropriate
section of the Exchange Act and (2) that it "fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the [FPI]." 6°
Important differences between the two certifications include: a
knowledge qualification is not required for Section 906 certification,6'
Section 302 certification but not the Section 906 certification is required as
part of an interim amendment to a Form 20-F report, 62 and the difference in
potential liability arising from the language difference discussed above.63
The Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting requires
management to provide an internal control report, which evaluates the
effectiveness of management's internal control over financial reporting.64
58 Section 404 Release, supra note 49, at Exhibit Table: Certifications; see also Extension
Press Release, supra note 7; Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14.
59 Paul D. Tosetti & Latham & Watkins LLP, Latham & Watkins Memoranda: Advanced
Doing Deals 2004: Dealmaking in the New Transactional Marketplace, 1433 PRAC. L. INST.
CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 13, 65 (June 7-8, 2004).
60 Id. at 66.
61 id.
62 id.
63 See supra Part II.E.
64 Tosetti & Latham & Watkins LLP, supra note 59, at 66.
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III. THE TRANSNATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE CERTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS
The SEC has a history of "liberally granting [FPIs] exemptions" from
otherwise applicable Securities and Exchange Act rules. 65  Exemptions
from proxy rules and liability rules regarding short-swing profits were
granted to FPIs as long ago as 1935 because of sufficient "disparity
between the laws and practices existing in the several countries. 6 6  The
SEC's policy in granting the exemptions has been characterized as a
"balancing test" that weighs "the risk of deterring foreign issuers from
accessing U.S. exchanges heavily against protecting investors. 67  For
example, the SEC exempts FPIs from filing quarterly financial reports.
Instead, it allows them to abide by their home countries' or home stock
exchanges' practices for more-often-than-annual reports. 68  Other
accommodations include exemptions from Exchange Act proxy rules, short-
swing profit recovery provisions, and individual executive compensation
disclosure requirements. 69  Given the exemptions that the SEC has
historically granted FPIs, non-U.S. observers were suprised when the
certification requirements were imposed with explicit statements that they
would apply to FPIs.70  These certification requirements were onerous
enough to make U.S. exchanges less attractive to many FPIs. 71 Had there
been a shift in the SEC "balancing test"?
72
Another way to characterize the SEC's dealings with FPIs is to say
that the SEC has historically required disclosure, but has resisted regulating
governance.73 FPIs have been offering securities in U.S. markets since at
65 Anupama J. Naidu, Was Its Bite Worse Than Its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-Oxley
Imposes on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY INT'L
L. REv. 271, 272 (2004).
66 Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities
Regulation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 715, 720 (quoting Exchange Act Release Nos. 323 &
325 (Class B), 1935 SEC LEXIs 316 (July 15, 1935)).
67 Naidu, supra note 65, at 277.
68 See Letter from Todd M. Malan, Executive Director, Organization for International
Investment, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2,
(Aug. 19, 2002) available at http://www.ofii.org/SECLetter081902.pdf (requesting that
the SEC exempt foreign private issuers from immediately-effective Sarbanes-Oxley
provisions, and requesting "appropriate accommodation" in other areas, including executive
certification) [hereinafter Letter of Organization for International Investment].
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See infra Part IV.
72 See Naidu, supra note 65, at 277.
73 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to
Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REv. 849, 852 (2004).
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least the 1920's. 74  When Congress established the SEC by passing the
Securities Act of 1933, "it contemplated the possibility that foreign issuers
might make offerings in the United States." 5 But corporate-governance
regulation in the 1930's was a matter of state, not national law, so the
SEC's task for both U.S. and foreign corporations was one of requiring
financial reports, rather than mandating governance structures.7  As
regulation of domestic issuers' governance matured throughout the 1970's,
80's, and 90's, SEC regulation of FPIs' governance lagged behind. For
example, the final version of Form 20-F eliminated some controversial
proposed disclosure requirements that would have affected governance, and
the SEC stated a goal of eventually allowing FPIs to report using
international accounting standards, rather than U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP).77 The certification requirements,
together with other Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, represent an unprecedented
regulatory expansion in the governance of FPIs by the U.S. system-so
unprecedented that a partner at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer predicted
"massive exempting activity" by the end of August 2002.78
The SEC's enforcement power over disclosure rules indisputably
extends to FPIs. If an FPI fails to provide required information, the SEC
can either initiate an administrative proceeding or file a federal civil suit
against it.79 Fraudulent statements or omissions by FPIs also render those
FPIs vulnerable to SEC enforcement action.8° Federal courts have
jurisdiction over FPIs in cases arising under the Exchange Act because FPIs
have "purposefully availed [themselves] of the American securities market"
by selling their securities to U.S. investors.
8 1
U.S. jurisdiction over FPIs for the purpose of corporate-governance
regulation has been questioned,82 but the Act's provisions have now been
71 See id. at 857-58.
75 Id. at 858.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 859-60.
78 Nicola Hobday, Porsche Delays U.S. Listing, THE DAILY DEAL, Aug. 21, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 22400483.
79 Naidu, supra note 65, at 302.
80 Id.; see also Mark S. Bergman, Non-U.S. Company Sued for False Public Statements
Made During Merger Negotiations, INSIGHTS, Nov. 2000 at 13.
81 Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 2002). See also McNamara
v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp.2d 628, 635 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that defendant,
"by encouraging over-the-counter trading of its stock in the United States, knew or should
have known that it would be amenable to suit in the United States"); In re Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 81 F. Supp. 2d 75, 78 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that "the defendant's knowledge that
the object will be sold in a particular forum combined with his exploitation of the market in
that forum would suffice" for the assertion of jurisdiction).
82 See Minodora D. Vancea, Note, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards
Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 DUKE L.J. 833 (2003)
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successfully applied against an FPI in a federal civil suit. On December 23,
2003, the SEC settled a civil fraud action against Vivendi Universal, a large
French conglomerate. 83 The SEC used Section 308(a) of the Act, which
adds civil penalties to disgorgement of funds recoverable from individual
securities-enforcement defendants, to freeze the Vivendi CEO's severance
84package for disgorgement.
The SEC has not been entirely unreceptive to FPIs' pleas for
exemptions from specific Sarbanes-Oxley provisions. It has accommodated
the German practice of employee representation on supervisory boards by
allowing non-management employees to qualify as "independent" for the
purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley audit committee membership rules 85 and
exempted certain financial statements made outside the United States from
U.S. GAAP reconciliation requirements.86 But these types of exemptions
are limited. "Massive exempting activity" has yet to take place. No
exemption has been granted from the certification requirements. The SEC
has insisted that the Act, by not distinguishing domestic and foreign
corporations, did not give it the authority to grant such broad exemptions to
FPIs. 7
IV. THE REACTION OF GERMAN CORPORATIONS AND
OBSERVERS TO THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Immediately following its passage, the Act raised hackles around the
globe for its perceived "unilateralism" and lack of statutory exemptions 88 -
in short, its apparent eagerness to impose U.S.-style governance
everywhere. The certification requirements were a focus of early
(arguing that U.S. courts should decline to assert jurisdiction over FPIs' corporate-
governance matters because their violations of U.S. corporate-governance rules do not rise to
the level of domestic effects required and because asserting jurisdiction would violate valid
comity principles).
83 Press Release, SEC, Commission Settles Civil Fraud Action Against Vivendi
Universal, S.A., Its Former CEO, Jean-Marie Messier, and Its Former CFO, Guillaume
Hannezo (Dec. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-1 84.htm
[hereinafter SEC Enforcement Press Release]; see also James Roberts, Sarbanes-Oxley: The
U.S. Experience and the UK. Reaction, Mondaq Business Briefing (Aug. 11, 2004) at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=27839.
84 See SEC Enforcement Press Release, supra note 83.
85 Final Rule: Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, IC-26001, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788 (Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
Audit Committee Exemption Release].
86 Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities and
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8176, 34-47226, FR-65, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820 (Jan. 22, 2003).
87 See, e.g., Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks at Deutsches Aktieninstitut, Feb. 4,
2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020403psa.htm.
88 Karmel, supra note 73, at 856.
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international objections. 89  German commentators and corporations, in
particular, feared the potential effects of the certification requirements.9"
The German industry federation Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
(BDI) warned that "German companies could be forced to withdraw from
U.S. exchanges unless they secured exemptions from the Act."91 A group
of eleven German corporations sent a comment letter to the SEC requesting
an exemption for FPIs from the certification requirements. 92  The letter
noted that "[t]he Commission's... tradition of extending comity [to FPIs]
was imwortant in convincing us to become U.S. registrants in the first
place.
On August 19, 2002, German automaker Porsche put its previously-
announced plans to list its securities on the New York Stock Exchange on
89 The certification issue was the basis for many objections. Many comments from
international corporations and entitites on the Amending Release, supra note 42, focused on
the certification requirements. See, e.g., E-mail from Jonathan Bates, Managing Director,
Institutional Design, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission
(Aug. 19, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/jbatesI .txt; E-mail
from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s72102/clearyl.htm; E-mail from Todd M. Malan, Executive Director, Organization for
International Investment, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s72102/tmmalanl.htm; E-mail from Hideo Hato, Director for Corporate Accounting and
Disclosure, Japanese Financial Services Agency, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s72102/hhatol.htm; E-mail from Ian Mullen, Chief Executive, British Bankers
Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 23,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/imullenl.htm; E-mail from
Darla C. Stuckey, Corporate Secretary, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/dcstuckeyl.htm; E-mail from Dr. Arnold
Knechtle, Director, The Federation of Swiss Industrial Holding Companies, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/aknechtle1.htm.
90 See, e.g., Hugh Williamson, Legal Action Possible over Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at 24 (citing "tougher rules in the U.S. on possible penalties for
management board members" and "the German two-tiered board system" as areas with
"potential for conflict"). See infra Part VI for a detailed discussion of the conflict between
the certification requirements and Germany's two-tiered, shared-responsibility corporate
system.
91 Bertrand Benoit, German Companies Upbeat on U.S. Rules, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002,
at 27.
92 See Certification: German Firms Ask SEC Not to Apply Rule On Certification to Non-
U.S. Private Issuers, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1426 (Aug. 26, 2002). The eleven
corporations were: DaimlerChrysler AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, Allianz AG, Altana AG,
BASF AG, Bayer AG, EON AG, Infineon Technologies AG, Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology
AG, SAP AG, and SGL CARBON AG.
93 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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hold.94 After the Adopting Release 95 did not include exemptions for FPIs,
and no other exempting activity appeared likely, Porsche announced that it
would never join the NYSE.96 Porsche cited the certification requirements
as "the crucial factor" in its decision:
[T]his new American ruling does not match the legal position in
Germany. In Germany, the annual financial statement is passed by the
entire Board of Management and is then presented to the Supervisory
Board, after being audited and certified by chartered accountants...
Therefore there is an overall responsibility ... involving over 20
persons... Any special treatment of the Chairman of the Board of
Management or the Director of Finance would be illogical [and]...
irreconcilable with current German law.
97
According to poll results, Porsche's opinion was shared by corporate
management throughout Europe.98 The new stringency of the regime to
which U.S. registrants would be subjected made pursuing a U.S. listing less
attractive. A U.S. listing-highly desirable as recently as the summer of
2001-now carried with it more regulatory burden than many European
corporations could bear.
99
Some German corporations already listed in the United States showed
a willingness to comply. The Financial Times reported in December 2002
that electronics giant Siemens had filed its Form 20-F with the required
certifications.'00  Dr. Heinrich von Pierer, president of Siemens's
management board, certified the form as Siemens's CEO.10' By September
2003, Altana AG was even expressing enthusiasm for the "opportunity to
94 Hobday, supra note 78.
95 See supra Part II.D.
96 Press Release, Porsche, Balance-sheet oath in the U.S.A. as a K.O. criterion: Porsche
dispenses with listing in New York (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://www2.porsche.com/
english/intlcompany/investorrelations/news/presreleases/021016.htm [hereinafter Porsche
Press Release].
97 Id. It should be noted that no decision regarding a U.S. listing is so simple that a single
consideration can alter it. FPIs large enough to consider U.S. listings must weigh hundreds
of variables. Porche's general counsel, Maria Arenz, told an interviewer in the spring of
2004 that "our internal debate predated Sarbanes Oxley, [which]... only made the decision
easier." Michael D. Goldhaber, Driving Force: A chat with the Gc of Porsche, which
declined to list on the New York Stock Exchange, CORPORATE COUNSEL, May 1, 2004,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1080851389251.
98 See Larry Schlessinger, Sarbanes-Oxley Scares off European CEOs,
AccountancyAge.com (Jan. 24, 2003), at http://www.accountancyage.com/News/1 132257.
99 See Michael Gruson, Global Shares of German Corporations and their Dual Listings
on the Frankfurt and New York Stock Exchanges, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 185, 187
(2001).
100 Benoit, supra note 91.
101 Id.
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review the company's reporting procedures and governance structures"
provided by the Act. 0 2 In November, Altana's management board chair,
Nikolaus Schweickart, called the Act, together with the German Corporate
Governance Code, "genuine steps in the direction of a system of good and
transparent corporate governance."' 0 3 Mr. Schweickart even opined that the
SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley exemptions and granting of additional time in the
Section 404 release were evidence that it understood "the needs of foreign
companies."
104
Mr. Schweickart's optimism notwithstanding, the Section 404 Release
and its requirement of an internal control report, combined with the
certification requirements, seemed to make a U.S. listing intolerable for
other U.S.-listed German corporations. Intershop Communications AG
(Intershop), listed on the NASDAQ, announced in October 2003 that it
would withdraw from the exchange and deregister with the SEC.'05 It
finished the arduous deregistration process in June 2004 and is no longer
subject to U.S. regulation and reporting requirements. 0 6 The Wall Street
Journal reported in September 2004 that Lion Bioscience AG, another
German FPI with a NASDAQ listing, was weighing whether to follow
suit.
10 7
Intershop's experiences illustrated one of the difficulties facing would-
be delisters: the only way to escape the U.S. regulatory regime is to
deregister with the SEC, which requires both delisting from U.S. exchanges
and demonstrating that fewer than 300 U.S. citizens are shareholders.1
0 8
The tangible costs for FPIs to comply with the certification
requirements are substantial.'0 9 To the extent that more of management's
time is spent verifying financial statements, the time loss represents a cost.
The new disclosures-the Section 404 report on internal controls, for
example-likewise present significant outlays of money and time. If an
102 The Global Stance on Sarbanes-Oxley: Non-US. companies say the benefits outweigh




105 Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee US. Exchanges, WALL ST.
J., Sep. 20, 2004, at C1.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., Kit Bingham, Lastminute's US flight may face delays, FIN. NEWS, Jul. 25,
2004 (reporting on U.K. company's deregistration and quoting a Latham & Watkins LLP
partner: "Delisting is easy. Deregistering is damn-near impossible these days. The crux of
the problem is that you have to keep your U.S. shareholder base below 300. To police that
on an ongoing basis is hard. You have to keep tabs on your worldwide shareholder basis on
a quarterly basis, which is very difficult for a large company.").
109 See, e.g., Naidu, supra note 65, at 304-05.
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FPI is prevented by the certifications from misrepresentations it otherwise
would have made (without detection and punishment), the loss of the gains
from those misrepresentations constitutes a cost. Finally, the imposition of
the certification requirements puts FPIs on notice of new forms of litigation
and enforcement. Prudence would require an FPI to prepare for the
eventuality of such litigation and enforcement. Such preparation can also
be counted among the costs of the requirements. 10
The certification requirements' tangible costs do not explain all of the
consternation the requirements caused in Germany. The Section V explains
the direct systemic conflict the requirements brought for German FPIs.
V. GERMAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE, PRACTICES AND
VALUES: HOW CERTIFICATION SHOCKS THE SYSTEM
An examination of basic German corporate structure, practices and
values provides crucial context for the German objections to the
certification requirements. The requirements focus on individual corporate
officers in assigning responsibility to prevent misstatements. Their goal is
to improve value for only one corporate constituency: the shareholders. To
the extent that the requirements prevent corporations from painting
deceptively rosy financial pictures, their effect will be to force greater
efficiency upon the bureaucracies of large German corporations. The
requirements' individual focus, investor-value goal, and probable effect are
inimical to the structural, practical and normative realities of the German
corporate model. The requirements are "shock therapy" for a rigid, bank-
controlled corporate system where risk is shunned and small investors are
ignored. Requiring executive certification on German FPIs' financial
statements is outrageous in the German context, but it forces those
corporations to move toward more investor-focused, responsive and
efficient business practices that are better for long-term economic growth.
This Part discusses the fundamental realities of German corporate
culture and explains that the culture is inhospitable to individual investors.
It next explains the failure of German attempts to reform the system.
Finally, it considers the direct systemic challenge the certification
requirements have introduced for German FPIs.
A. Basic German Corporate Structure
The German equivalent to the U.S. publicly-traded corporation is the
Aktiengesellschaft (AG).111 Unlike a U.S. corporation, which is governed
by the laws of the states in which it incorporates, the AG is governed by the
"o See id.
1 Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German Corporate Law Norms,
16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431,434-35 (2002).
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federal Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act)." 2  The AG is tightly
regulated; its Satzung (articles) "may deviate from the provisions of the
Stock Corporation Act only to the extent that the Act itself expressly so
permits."'13 Three Organe (statutory bodies) govern the AG: the Vorstand
(management board), the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) and the
Hauptversammlung (shareholders' meeting). H 4  The supervisory board
appoints the members of the management board and is itself elected by the
shareholders' meeting and corporate employees; however, none of the three
Organe can order another to take specific actions."15
The management board is the Organe most similar to the U.S. board of
directors. 116  However, none of its members are independent-the
management board can be likened to a board of directors composed entirely
of corporate officers."17 It is charged, collectively, with the day-to-day
management of the AG." 8 Its members are appointed by the supervisory
board."19 Unlike the chairman of a U.S. board of directors, the chairman of
the management board is not invested with special authorityl' 2 0-in fact,
some AGs use the title Sprecher (spokesman), rather than Virsitzender
(chairman) for their management-board chair.' ' The management board
must report to the supervisory board regarding the AG's "intended business
policy;" profitability; "state of business, in particular revenues;" and also
report any major transactions. 22  Originally, the Stock Corporation Act
specifically directed the management board to take four different interests
into account in its activities: the welfare of the AG itself, the stockholders,
the employees, and the state. 23 This fourfold enumeration of the board's
duties contrasted sharply with the U.S. profit-maximizing ethic. The
German legislature removed the provision in 1965, but its stated reasoning
for doing so was that the duties were, and would remain, implicit.'
24
The supervisory board is comparable to the external directors on a U.S.




116 Chantayan, supra note 111, at 438.
117 See Hutter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 13.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Florian Stamm, A Comparative Study of Monitoring of Management in German and
U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where are the German Enrons, WorldComs, and
Tycos?, 32 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 813, 827 (2004).
121 See Hutter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 13.
122 Aktiengesetz, § 90 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Stock Corporation Act].
123 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 440; Stamm, supra note 120, at 827-28.
124 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 440; Stamm, supra note 120, at 827-28.
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board.125  Employees elect up to half of its membership, 26 with the
remainder selected by the shareholders. 127 The supervisory board
theoretically safeguards shareholders' interests by overseeing the
management board; 28 however, it may not take on management
responsibilities 129 and its members are not legally capable of binding the
AG.130  Members of the management board may not serve on the
supervisory board,' 3 ' but a single person may serve on the supervisory
boards of up to ten AGs.
132
The shareholders' meeting is required, by the Stock Corporation Act,
to convene annually. 133 Beyond selecting the portion of the supervisory
board that is not selected by employees,134 its involvement is necessary only
for the most important of corporate decisions. 135  Like the supervisory
board, it is not entitled to take part in corporate management. 36
One of the most important aspects of any corporate-governance system
is the extent to which corporate management can be held legally responsible
for derelictions of their duty to shareholders. German management board
members' actions are subject to greater potential legal liability than that of
U.S. board members because there is no German equivalent to the business-
judgment rule. 137  Management board members are individually
responsiblefor exercising the care of a "diligent and prudent business
executive." 38 Moreover, they bear the burden of proof in litigation over
alleged derelictions of this duty. 13 9 But the German system limits who can
bring such a suit. Ordinarily, the management board itself is the only entity
capable of suing on the corporation's behalf. 140 When management board
125 See Hutter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 14.
126 See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of codetermination.
127 See Hutter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 14.
128 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 439.
129 Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 111.
130 Chantayan, supra note 111, at 438.
131 Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of
German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 555, 563 (2000); Stock
Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 100.
132 Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 100.
133 See Hurter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 14.
134 See infra Part V.B. for a discussion on codetermination.
135 Id. See also Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 119.
136 Butler, supra note 131, at 571.
137 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 442-43.
138 Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 93; Hurter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6,
at 17.
139 See Butler, supra note 131, at 569.
140 Chantayan, supra note 111, at 443-44; Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, §
71(1).
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members are sued by the corporation, the only entity capable of bringing
the suit is the supervisory board. 41 It is possible for shareholders to force
an unwilling supervisory board to do this, but German civil procedure
imposes powerful disincentives on such an action.142 Unlike the United
States, Germany does not allow shareholders themselves to sue
management by asserting the rights of the corporation.1
43
B. Notable German Corporate Practices
To understand the system into which the Sarbanes-Oxley certification
requirements have introduced individual responsibility and a focus on
shareholder interests, two integral statutory (or perhaps quasi-statutory)
practices must be examined. These practices are the control wielded by
German banks over large AGs, and codetermination.
German banks are powerhouses of corporate control. Unlike their U.S.
counterparts, they are not restricted from owning majority stakes in
corporations.' 44 Groups of banks own controlling blocks of most large
AGs' shares. 145  Moreover, German law allows for the formation of
universal banks-institutions that engage in both investment and
commercial services. 146 The common practice of individual investors is to
purchase shares through commercial banks, keep the shares deposited with
those banks, and allow the banks to exercise the voting rights. 147 Finally,
AGs acquire expansion capital from bank loans to a greater extent than by
issuing securities. 48 By owning majority stakes in most AGs, exercising
proxy voting rights for non-bank shareholders, and serving as the primary
source of capital for expansion, German banks have developed enormous
influence.
German banks' majority stakes in the nation's large AGs have led to
the control of supervisory boards by bank representatives. 149  It is verycommon for members of banks' management and supervisory boards to sit
141 Chantayan, supra note 11, at 443-44; Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 112.
142 See Butler, supra note 131, at 601 (noting that the German Zivilprozessordnung
requires losing parties to bear the costs of litigation and forbids attorneys to use contingency-
fee arrangements).
143 Chantayan, supra note 111, at 443-44.
144 See Stamm, supra note 119, at 829-30.
145 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 435.
146 See id.
147 See Bernd Singhof & Oliver Seiler, Shareholder Participation in Corporate
Decisionmaking Under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 439,
508 (1998); see also Stamm, supra note 120, at 829-30.
148 See Stamm, supra note 119, at 829.
149 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 441-42; Stamm, supra note 120, at 840.
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on the supervisory boards of AGs where the banks hold large stakes.150 The
result is an "interlocking supervisory board relationship," where a small
group of individuals from a relatively small group of banks holds sway over
the most important AGs' supervisory boards. 1
51
The prevalence of Depotstimmrecht der Banken (depository voting
rights of banks) reinforces the power banks already wield as majority
owners. Banks exercising depository voting rights owe certain duties to the
shareholders, but those duties are far less than the duties of U.S. proxy
holders. 152 Germany's "big three" banks-Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank
and Commerzbank-are said to wield sufficient proxy power to have as
much influence on the governance of large AGs as their management.
1 53
For several reasons, most importantly, the fact that the shareholders elect a
portion of the supervisory board, rather than directly electing management,
German AGs do not experience the bitter proxy fights that are common in
the United States.
1 54
The third pillar of bank control is the AGs' dependence for funding on
loans, rather than private investment. 55 German management boards need
not pay as close attention to short-term profits and dividends as U.S.
management because their ability to raise capital is not as closely tied to
their ability to attract individual and institutional customers for their
securities.
Bank control has several important consequences for the management,
strategy and culture of Germany's large AGs. Because bank loans fund
corporate expansion and banks dominate supervisory boards (both through
direct ownership and through proxy power), banks' conservatism is
theoretically a more important check on management than is the whim of
shareholders. 56  Yet, the bank-heavy supervisory boards tend to give
management wide latitude, even tolerating significant inefficiency.'57 This
is because the banks see the AGs, not as investments, but as customers with
whom they must maintain relationships. 58 Furthermore, banks are more
interested in their corporate customers' long-term solvency and stability
than in achieving high rates of return on their own investments. Therefore,
they are likely to use their influence to encourage AGs' management boards
150 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 441-42; Butler, supra note 131, at 574.
151 Chantayan, supra note 111, at 441-42.
152 See Singhof & Seiler, supra note 147, at 511, 513-14.
"' Id. at 517.
114 Id at 512-13.
'5' See Stamm, supra note 120, at 829.
156 See id. at 831.
157 See id. at 846.
158 See Singhof& Seiler, supra note 147, at 520.
Shock Therapy for Aktiengesellschaflen
25:453 (2005)
to pursue conservative policies.
159
Bank control also tends to minimize the influence of non-bank
shareholders. Proxy fights160  and shareholders' associations with
significant power 161 do not exist in Germany. For investors who seek high
rates of return from lean, mean corporations, bank control "seriously
undermines a system that looks promising on paper."
162
Codetermination, the representation of labor on AGs' supervisoryi
boards, is one of the defining principles of German industry.
Mitbestimmungsgesetze (codetermination laws) require certain percentages
of supervisory boards to be elected by labor.' 64 The percentage varies
depending on the AG's size and industry.165 The supervisory board of an
AG with two thousand or more employees (unless it is in the mining, iron,
or steel industry) must be equal parts labor and shareholder representatives,
except that one of the labor representatives must be a "management
executive." 66
Relative to U.S. practice, codetermination adds a corporate
constituency. Boards of directors in the United States must worry about
pleasing shareholders and lenders; German management boards must
consider the demands of shareholders, lenders and labor.167 Significantly,
the labor constituency tends to support conservative corporate policies
because its only concern is the preservation of jobs, pay and benefits.
168
Beyond this initial dilution of ownership influence, it is suggested that
[M]anagers and stockholders sapped the supervisory board of power (or,
more accurately, prevented it from evolving into a serious governance
institution...) to reduce employee influence in the firm. Board
meetings are infrequent, information flow to the board is poor, and the
board is often too big and unwieldy to be effective.
169
For small investors, the problem with minimizing the supervisory
board's power is that it leaves them with no voice at all. "0 Power devolves
159 See id. at 519-20.
160 See id. at 512-13
161 See id. at 528-29.
162 Stamm, supra note 120, at 814.
163 Butler, supra note 131, at 561-62.
164 Stamm, supra note 120, at 821.
165 Butler, supra note 131, at 562-64.
166 Id. at 562-63.
167 Stamm, supra note 120, at 834-35.
161 Id. at 835.
169 Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 167, 167-68 (1998); see also Chantayan, supra note 111, at 450-51.
170 See id.
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to "out-of-the-boardroom shareholder caucuses and meetings between
managers and large stockholders,"'' 71 and blockholding banks benefit.
Codetermination does not make economic sense because labor favors
institutional survival over efficiency. 72  Over the long term, everyone,
including labor, benefits most when corporations keep costs down, invest in
expansion and drive economic growth. But labor's "conservatism and one-
sided goal of preservation of the employment force.., have stalled
transactions and impeded the efficacy of the German corporation.'
173
Professor Helmut Kohl suggests that codetermination is a good example of
"path dependency," the survival of inefficient institutions that have become
ingrained in the larger social order: "codetermination limits contractual
freedom and private property... [but] the only scenarios I can imagine that
would effectively abolish codetermination are a revolution or an
extortion."' 74 Although some mitigation of the effects of codetermination
has begun to occur, 175 the negative effects of the phenomenon for
shareholders-dilution of their influence on the AG and damage to the
AG's profit motive-remain significant.
C. German Corporate Values
The structural and practical realities, as discussed above, reinforce, and
are reinforced by, three overriding and related values of German corporate
culture. These values-conservatism, collectivism and survival-are
generally inimical to the interests of individual (non-bank) shareholders.
They also are associated with slow economic growth and the continued
weakness, discussed below, of German capital markets.
German AGs tend to follow conservative growth patterns for several
reasons, some of which are discussed above. In addition to the banks' love
of stability and labor's need for security, commentators point out that
German investors themselves are risk-averse.' 76 Moreover, AGs generally,
not only banks, tend to invest heavily in one another, producing a pervasive,
almost organic interdependency. 77 Investors' risk-aversion and corporate
interconnectedness, combined with the fact that AGs are far less dependent
171 Roe, supra note 169, at 168.
172 See Butler, supra note 131, at 602.
173 Stamm, supra note 120, at 845-46.
174 Helmut Kohl, Corporate Governance: Path Dependence and German Corporate
Law: Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sideline, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189,193, 195 (1999).
171 See Chantayan, supra note 11, at 451.
176 Naidu, supra note 65, at 282; Chantayan, supra note 111, at 449-50; Stamm, supra
note 120, at 837, 855 (stating "German capital has been described as 'patient,' meaning
Germans tend to be more tolerant of management inefficiencies before moving capital out of
a corporation").
177 See Stamm, supra note 120, at 854-55.
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than U.S. corporations on investors' capital,1 78 all help reinforce a powerful
inertia in the German corporate mindset. AGs' structure and control
produce a managerial bias in favor of caution and survival, and against
aggression and growth.
A pronounced collectivist bent, both internal and external, can be
discerned within the German corporate culture. Governance and policy are
dictated by consensus, rather than by competitive checks among different
constituencies and governance bodies. Critics charge that "in some
corporations the [supervisory board] has become a part of the management
and thus, lost its ability to objectively monitor" the management board. 79
The U.S. corporate system is characterized by the separation of ownership
and control; this separation appears to be much less clear in Germany. 180 If
the supervisory and management boards of an AG do not effectively check
one another, the interests of minority shareholders are in jeopardy. The
problem becomes even more serious when one views all AGs as a whole.
With members of banks' boards-both management and supervisory-
serving on the supervisory boards of most large AGs, 181 it becomes quite
doubtful that ownership and control are distinct in any real sense.
To the extent that Germany, relatively speaking, tends toward political
collectivism, its corporations become less attractive investments for
individuals. Although the management board is no longer statutorily
obligated to give weight to the interests of the AG itself, the stockholders,
the employees, and the state, 82 "German political sentiment has been that
economic efficiency has been worth sacrificing to 'protect' non-shareholder
constituencies." 83
Institutional survival, for the purpose of preserving jobs, is the
overriding value for the labor representatives on the supervisory board.
84
The involvement of labor in the corporate-governance structure renders
cost-cutting very difficult. 85 If economic efficiency can be sacrificed for
the sake of non-shareholder constituencies, there will be pressure for AGs
to continue fiscally indefensible operations in order to keep people
employed, maintain service to politically significant groups or geographic
areas, or retain a German presence in particular industries more cheaply
178 See id.
179 Butler, supra note 131, at 602.
180 Stamm, supra note 120, at 845.
181 See Butler, supra note 130, at 574.
182 See supra Part V.A. (discussing management board's duties to various constituencies,
formerly imposed via statute but now considered "implicit").
183 Stamm, supra note 120, at 854.
184 See Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational
Business Enterprise, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 975, 997 (1999).
185 See supra Part V.B. (discussing inefficient economics of codetermination).
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pursued in other countries. If serving the interests of the AG itself, the
employees and the state are on a par with making a profit for the
investors, 186 there are plenty of defenses for fiscally irresponsible decisions.
German AGs are seen as institutions that provide benefits for many
constituencies beyond investors.
D. Implications of German Corporate Structure, Practices, and Values for
Investors
Individual investors wield far less power in Germany than in the
United States.1 87  First, they are unable to effect change directly in the
corporate-governance system. The German system's interposition of the
supervisory board between shareholders and management board insulates
management from direct accountability. 188 The supervisory board is not
likely to represent the interests of individual investors.' 89 Their voice, if
present at all, is muffled by the dominance of banks and the required
representation of labor. 90 Second, individual investors in Germany lack the
legal tools provided in the U.S. system to call management to account for
derelictions of duty. Only supervisory boards can sue management on
behalf of the corporation,' ' and supervisory boards are often too closely
identified with management to serve as an effective check. 192 Third, the
individual investors are few and insignificant in the German system. The
German system uses "the precautionary attitude of banks, and not the threat
of individual shareholder liquidity, as a check on management."' 93 The
significance of individual investors is demonstrated by a banker's comment
that has become a clichd in German financial literature: "Shareholders are
dumb when they buy stock and impertinent because they also want a
dividend."' 194 Large AGs are said to "resemble 'semi-private' companies"
in their illiquid ownership and lack of concern for minority stakeholders.' 
95
In this context, it is not surprising that German AGs do not place a
primary focus on investors' interests.196 As a consequence, the German
186 See supra Part V.A. (discussing management board's duties to various constituencies,
formerly imposed via statute but now considered "implicit").
187 See Chantayan, supra note 110, at 455.
188 See Butler, supra note 131, at 564-65.
189 Id. at 602-03.
190 Stamm, supra note 120, at 833.
191 See supra Part VI.A.
192 See Stamm, supra note 120, at 845.
19' Id. at 831.
194 Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon
Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 105 (1998).
195 See Roe, supra note 169, at 167.
196 See Naidu, supra note 65, at 282; Chantayan, supra note 111, at 455.
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capital markets are poorly developed' 97 and are not attractive to foreign
investment. 198 For example, required disclosure is much less in Germany
than in the United States, r99 and there is no German equivalent to the United
State's SEC.200 The inhospitality of German capital markets is a matter of
pressing concern for the country's policymakers. As global competition
intensifies, German AGs will fail to remain competitive if they are unable
to make the transition from debt financing to equity financing by attracting
significant numbers of individual investors.20'
E. Attempts at Reform from within the German System
It is widely recognized that "the bank-dominated system has hindered
Germany's economic growth, 20 2 and efforts to modernize German
securities markets and make them more attractive for individual investors
are under way. But these efforts have met with setbacks during the last four
years. The Deutsche Bourse AG, which runs Germany's largest stock
exchange, the Frankfurter Wertpapierborse, set up a new exchange modeled
on the NASDAQ, the Neuer Markt, in 1997203 The Neuer Markt
"advertised high standards of disclosure and transparency" and strived to be
204a vehicle for the expansion of Germany's base of individual investors.
But it failed a few years after its founding.2 5 The Deutsche Bourse AG's
attempts to merge with the London Stock Exchange, Europe's largest stock
exchange, came to an end in 2000.206
Another recent attempt at improving the investment climate for
individual investors was the February 2002 publication of the German
197 See, e.g., Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internationalization
of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the
European Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 565, at 2.2 (agreeing that
the German securities market is "narrow, thin and boring," with very few listed corporations,
and characterizing German industries as "undercapitalized" compared to U.S. industries).
198 See Singhof& Seiler, supra note 147, at 494.
199 See Stamm, supra note 120, at 836-37.
200 Id. at 837; Naidu, supra note 65, at 299-300 (The German Federal Securities Trading
Supervisory Office (BAWe) is not authorized to "implement penalties for manipulation of
the market or other violations," and its staff is tiny compared with that of the SEC.
Enforcement of securities laws rests with the Land Supervisory Stock Exchange Authorities
(Lander), but "their familiarity with this field is limited.").
201 See Singhof& Seiler, supra note 147, at 540.
202 See Chantayan, supra note 111, at 449. Chantayan concludes that "Germany will
have to fundamentally change its system to overcome shareholder distrust of the stock
market, as well as other cultural norms, to attract a more diverse group of investors." Id. at
455.
203 Naidu, supra note 65, at 306.
204 Id. at 307.
205 Id. at 308.
206 Id.
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Corporate Governance Code by a commission established by the
Chancellor.2 °7 The Code, however, does not constitute new binding law.20 8
Instead, it reiterates previously existing laws and sets forth two categories
of "best practices:" recommendations, indicated by the directive word shall;
and suggestions, indicated by the words should, may, and can.20 9 The
recommendations have been given additional force by the passage of the
Transparency and Disclosure Law, which went into force as part of the
Stock Corporation Act in July 2002.210 The Transparency and Disclosure
Law requires AGs to declare their compliance or non-compliance with each
of the recommendations in the Code.21' A more stringent, earlier version of
the law would have required AGs to explain any non-compliance.2 2
Among the most important of the Code's recommendations, in light of
this article's discussion above, are disclosure requirements for management
board members' potential conflicts of interest; supervisory board approval
for "significant transactions" between management board members and the
company; and a prohibition on more than two former management board
members serving on the supervisory board.213
But one commentator, Lutz-Christian Wolff, charges that the Code is
more likely a "marketing tool to improve the attractiveness of Germany's
capital markets to foreign institutional investors" than a genuine set of
reforms.214 He argues that none of the Code's recommendations require
major changes in corporate practice:
[T]he practical impact of the recommendations is of minor significance
either because they simply confirm already existing corporate practice
or because the wording is vague and does not require sincere
commitment.
2 15
To the extent that Wolff is correct, the Code will not significantly
improve the hospitability of German AGs to individual investors.
Moreover, the Code's recommendations are dependent on market pressure
207 See Lutz-Christian Wolff, Law as a Marketing Gimmick-The Case of the German
Corporate Governance Code, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STuD. L. REv. 115, 121 (2004); German
Corporate Governance Code, available at http://www.corporate-govemance-code.de/
eng/download/DCGKE.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
208 Hutter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 16.
209 See id.; see also Wolff, supra note 207, at 121-22.
210 Stock Corporation Act, supra note 122, § 161.
211 See Wolff, supra note 207, at 122-23.
212 Hutter, Develin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 16.
213 id.
214 Wolff, supra note 207, at 133.
215 Id. at 132.
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for enforcement. 1 6
F. The Certification Requirements' Shock to the System
The Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements, unlike the German
system's attempts at self-reform, represent real change for those large
German AGs that are FPIs subject to SEC regulation. The requirements'
focus, goal, and direct and indirect effects all threaten certain investor-
unfriendly aspects of the German system. Imposed by a resourceful, well-
funded regulator that has demonstrated its willingness to engage in
transnational enforcement, the requirements will compel painful, but
ultimately beneficial adjustments for the AGs to apply.
21 7
The certification requirements compel executive and financial officers
to involve themselves personally in the preparation of financial
218statements, and make them liable, as individuals, for the failure to do so.
This individual focus is inimical to the internal collectivism that
characterizes German corporate governance. 219 Forcing the chair of the
management board to take on personal responsibility for a financial
statement formerly "passed by the entire Board of Management and...
then presented to the Supervisory Board, after being audited and certified
by chartered accountants," 220-and vouched for by all of those people,
collectively-is beyond a doubt a wrenching and drastic change. But it
provides a mighty incentive for that person to do everything possible to
ensure the statement's accuracy. Different levels of responsibility and
liability will encourage the kind of checks that have suffered under German
corporate collectivism.
The certification requirements are imposed with the explicit aim of
ensuring the veracity of financial statements, for the benefit of investors. 22'
This goal forces a rearranging of AGs' priorities. It is a step toward
shareholder-friendly operations for AGs that currently juggle obligations to
shareholders, themselves, labor and society. Mandated verity in financial
statements can be bad for institutional survival, and subsequently bad for
labor if it prevents an AG from misrepresentations and from forestalling
bankruptcy by fraudulently attracting new investment. It can be bad for the
state; a bankrupt AG pays no taxes. Verity in financial statements benefits
the investment community directly; it only benefits the AG, labor and the
state over the long term, as the appearance and reality of openness attract
216 See Hutter, Devlin & Burkard, supra note 6, at 16.
217 See supra Part III (discussing SEC enforcement action against Vivendi Universal).
218 See supra Part II.A. (discussing the SEC's characterization of the thrust of the June
Proposal).
219 See supra Part V.C. (discussing German AGs' internal collectivism).
220 Porsche Press Release, supra note 96.
221 See supra Part II.
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more investments. The certification requirements' goal of benefiting
investors, "dumb when they buy stock and impertinent because they also
want a dividend,, 222 represents confrontation and conflict for the survival-
oriented German way of doing business.
The certification requirements, by improving the quality and veracity
of disclosure, indirectly encourage greater corporate efficiency and more
ambitious risk-taking for German FPIs. Investors demand efficiency and
high growth, and they will be better able to make comparisons between
German FPIs and other investment opportunities if the truthfulness of
German disclosure improves.
VI. CONCLUSION: CERTIFICATIONS ARE A NEEDED
ADJUSTMENT FOR GERMAN FPIS
Some commentators urge the SEC to grant FPIs exemptions to the
certification requirements. 3 It is warned that the transnational application
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will "antagonize foreign countries, undermining
the ability of the United States to enforce the Act abroad,, 224 and diminish
FPIs' enthusiasm for listing in the United States.225
These criticisms miss the point. The certification requirements,
together with the rest of Sarbanes-Oxley, may well diminish the short-term
appeal of U.S. exchanges for FPIs. But it is not the goal of securities
regulation to make exchanges attractive to issuers. The regulation of
securities is ordained to protect investors, and particularly to protect
individuals whose small holdings do not comprise significant portions of
issuers' equity. The activities of such small investors are individually
insignificant. Collectively, however, they are responsible for the U.S.
markets' extraordinary success.
The SEC's strict regulatory regime has allowed vast numbers of small
investors to flourish in the United States. As a result, more investment
capital is available in U.S. markets than anywhere else. Hence, the U.S.
markets' long history of attracting FPIs.
Germany's regulatory regime is less strict and its AGs, as a rule, are
less appealing to small investors. As a result, German AGs and markets are
not competitive in the intensifying global battle for investment. The
certification requirements force wrenching and counter-cultural but
investor-friendly changes on German corporations listed in the United
States. The German FPIs that accept the certification requirements' 'shock
222 See supra Part V.D.
223 See, e.g., Naidu, supra note 65, at 313.
224 Vancea, supra note 82, at 838.
225 See Karmel, supra note 73, at 887.
Shock Therapy for Aktiengesellschafien
25:453 (2005)
therapy' by keeping their U.S. listings will take a small step toward the
competitiveness that German business currently lacks.
Investors will reward corporations that subject themselves to the tough
standards, including the certification requirements, of the SEC's regime.
The certification requirements may be painful 'shock therapy' for German
FPIs, but they represent cultural and practical transformations. The long-
term benefits of these transformations will be greater efficiency and
improved investor appeal. For far-sighted aktiengesellschaften, the "shock
therapy" will be justified.
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APPENDIX I: SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:
2 26
Corporate responsibility for financial reports
(a) Regulations required:
The Commission shall, by rule, require, for each company filing
periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)), that the principal
executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or
officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in each
annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under either such
section of such Act that-
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading;
(3) based on such officer's knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in the
report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and
for, the periods presented in the report;
(4) the signing officers-
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that
material information relating to the issuer and its
consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such
officers by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which the periodic reports are
being prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's
internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the
report; and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about
the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their
evaluation as of that date;
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer's auditors
and the audit committee of the board of directors (or persons
fulfilling the equivalent function)-
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls which could adversely
affect the issuer's ability to record, process, summarize,
and report financial data and have identified for the
issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in internal
226 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, supra note 4.
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controls; and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant
role in the issuer's internal controls; and
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether
or not there were significant changes in internal controls or
in other factors that could significantly affect internal
controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including
any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies
and material weaknesses.
(b) Foreign reincorporations have no effect
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted or applied in any way
to allow any issuer to lessen the legal force of the statement
required under this section, by an issuer having reincorporated or
having engaged in any other transaction that resulted in the
transfer of the corporate domicile or offices of the issuer from
inside the United States to outside of the United States.
(c) Deadline
The rules required by subsection (a) of this section shall be
effective not less than 30 days after July 30, 2002.
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APPENDIX II: SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:
2 27
Failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports
(a) Certification of periodic financial reports.-Each periodic
report containing financial statements filed by an issuer with the
Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a)
or 78o(d)) shall be accompanied by a written statement by the
chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or equivalent
thereof) of the issuer.
(b) Content.-The statement required under subsection (a) shall
certify that the periodic report containing the financial statements
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act pf [sic] 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
78o(d)) and that information contained in the periodic report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer.
(c) Criminal penalties.-Whoever-
(1) certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and
(b) of this section knowing that the periodic report
accompanying the statement does not comport with all the
requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more
than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both; or
(2) willfully certifies any statement as set forth in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section knowing that the
periodic report accompanying the statement does not
comport with all the requirements set forth in this section
shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both.
227 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, supra note 5.
